威廉•詹姆斯
威廉•詹姆斯(1842—1910)，美国机能主义心理学和实用主义哲学的先驱。19世纪70年代詹姆斯参加“形而上学俱乐部”，认识了皮尔斯(Charles Sanders Peirce，1839—1914)，受其影响一起创建了实用主义哲学流派。1875年，他建立美国第一个心理学实验室。他于1904年当选为美国心理学会主席，1906年当选为国家科学院院士。威廉·詹姆斯最具影响的著作有《心理学原理》(The Principles of Psychology，1890)和《实用主义》(Pragmatism，1907)。前者是西方心理学经典文献之一，首创意识流理论和情绪理论，对当时乃至后来的心理学、文学、哲学、教育等领域产生了重要影响。后者是詹姆斯转而研究哲学后的代表作，阐明了以效用判定真理的实用主义主张。本篇选自《实用主义》。What Pragmatism Means(Excerpt)
by William JamesSome years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I returned from a solitary ramble to find everyone engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute．The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel--a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree—trunk；while over against the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand．This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree，but no matter how fast he goes，the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction，and always keeps the tree between himself and the man，so that never a glimpse of him is caught．The resultant metaphysical problem now is this：Does the man go round the squirrel or not? He goes round the tree，sure enough，and the squirrel is on the tree；but does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness，discussion had been worn threadbare．Everyone had taken sides，and was obstinate；and the numbers on both sides were even．Each side, when I appeared，therefore appealed to me to make it a majority．Mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and found one, as follows："Which party is right," I said，"depends on what you practically mean by 'going round' the squirrel．If you mean passing from the north of him to the east，then to the south, then to the west and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him，for he occupies these successive positions．But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him，then on the right of him，then behind him, then on his left，and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go round him，for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes，he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time，and his back turned away．Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any farther dispute．You are both right and both wrong according as you conceive the verb 'to go round' in one practical fashion or the other."
Although one or two of the hotter disputants called my speech a shuffling evasion，saying they wanted no quibbling or scholastic hair-splitting，but meant just plain honest English 'round,' the majority seemed to think that the distinction had assuaged the dispute．
I tell this trivial anecdote because it is a peculiarly simple example of what I wish now to speak of as the pragmatic method．The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable．Is the world one or many?--fated or free?--material or spiritual?-- here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right.
A glance at the history of the idea will show you still better what pragmatism means．The term is derived from the same Greek word【pi rho alpha gamma mu alpha】，meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' come．It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr．Charles Peirce in 1878．In an article entitled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," in the Popular Science Monthly for January of that year Mr．Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that to develop a thought's meaning，we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce：that conduct is for us its sole significance．And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice．To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve - what sensations we are to expect from it,and what reactions we must prepare．Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote，is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.
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